Shawqi Abu Nasira, a former Palestinian Authority police official, said this week he has begun organizing a small armed force in the eastern Gaza Strip to challenge Hamas and protect civilians in areas now outside the group’s direct control, according to local reports. He described the effort as a response to what he called renewed efforts by Hamas to reassert influence during a pause in fighting.
The emergence of ad hoc armed groups in Gaza is part of a broader fragmentation of authority that raises questions about security, governance and the delivery of humanitarian aid. In our Conflict Coverage, analysts say such forces complicate stabilization efforts and the creation of accountable security institutions.
Why this matters
Rival militias can provide short-term protection to communities that reject Hamas rule, but they also risk creating competing centers of power. That fragmentation can make it harder to coordinate aid, slow reconstruction and increase the likelihood of local clashes. For governments and aid agencies, the key concern is how to promote security while preserving the rule of law and clear chains of command.
Background
Abu Nasira has said he served years in Israeli custody before leaving his post with the Palestinian Authority. He told regional media that his split with Hamas deepened after the group killed his only son and publicly displayed the body, an event he described as decisive in his decision to oppose the organization. Those claims are his account and have been reported in regional outlets.
He said his group has moved into areas east of a locally referred-to yellow line, territory that he described as under Israeli military influence. Abu Nasira acknowledged his force is limited in manpower and equipment and has appealed for outside assistance to expand operations and organize a broader coordination mechanism he called a potential National Guard for east Gaza.
Armed landscape and reported groups
Independent observers and local reporting describe a more complex landscape of armed actors that have grown more visible as Hamas’s control has been challenged during recent fighting. None of the emerging groups match Hamas in size or firepower, but several have gained local prominence. Reported names and networks include:
- Popular Forces in Rafah
- Popular Army in northern Gaza
- Counter-Terrorism Strike Force in Khan Yunis
- Shujaiya Popular Defense Forces in eastern Gaza City
- Clan-based networks such as families linked to al-Majayda and Doghmosh
These groups range from loosely organized neighborhood defense networks to better armed factions. Abu Nasira said dozens of fighters have joined him so far and that many Gazans displaced by the war oppose Hamas rule. He also described early talks aimed at unifying disparate forces under a single political structure for parts of Gaza.
Statements, claims and corroboration
Much of the available detail about Abu Nasira’s force comes from his own statements to regional media and from local reporting. Independent verification of membership numbers, armaments and command arrangements is limited. Analysts caution that public claims by new leaders often overstate capacity in the early stages of organizing.
Abu Nasira has framed his effort as an internal Palestinian initiative and appealed for international backing, arguing that outside support would accelerate efforts to remove Hamas from Gaza. He has also linked Hamas to broader regional networks, warning of coordination among Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran; those broader geopolitical claims reflect long-standing concerns among some regional actors and analysts, but each element is disputed and should be treated as an allegation unless independently verified.
Reactions and operational risks
Analysts and aid officials warn that the proliferation of armed groups complicates efforts to restore order. Shifting alliances and varied command structures increase the risk of localized fighting and abuses that could undermine humanitarian operations and reconstruction. Aid organizations depend on predictable security and deconfliction mechanisms to reach civilians, and fragmented control makes that coordination harder.
There are also accountability concerns. International actors that consider supporting local security actors face hard questions about vetting, oversight and the potential of strengthening groups that lack clear chains of command or respect for civilian protection. Under international law and donor rules, assistance to armed actors carries reputational and legal risks if recipients commit abuses.
Operationally, Gaza’s borders and crossings remain a key factor. Israel retains major control over maritime access and most land crossings, while Egypt plays a central role at the Rafah crossing. Any lasting security or reconstruction plan will require coordination among local Palestinian actors, Israel, neighboring states and international institutions such as the United Nations and major donor countries.
Analysis
The rise of small rival militias in Gaza underscores a classic governance tradeoff between immediate protection and long-term state-building. Local fighters who oppose Hamas might fill a security vacuum and shield communities from immediate threats, but without integration into accountable institutions they risk becoming enduring sources of instability.
For policymakers, the immediate priorities are clear. First, support mechanisms for humanitarian access and civilian protection must be reinforced so relief can reach those in need. Second, any external assistance to local security formations should include strong vetting, oversight and plans for eventual integration into disciplined, accountable forces subject to civilian control. Third, regional diplomacy should aim to reduce external interference that could fuel militia growth and to incentivize clear governance arrangements.
At stake are basic questions of rule of law and governance. How Gaza’s security landscape is managed will affect aid flows, reconstruction timelines and regional stability. If nascent forces evolve into disciplined security institutions with transparent accountability, they could contribute to stabilization. If they become competing armed centers with weak oversight, they will likely prolong insecurity and undermine prospects for orderly reconstruction and governance.
Ultimately, the situation calls for a coordinated approach that balances immediate security needs with long-term institution building, strong oversight and respect for civilian protections. The choices made by local leaders, regional powers and international donors in the months ahead will shape whether these groups help rebuild governance or further fragment authority in Gaza.
