Conflict

Terror Groups Shape Somalia’s Security as Capital Grows

MOGADISHU, Somalia – Militant groups including al-Shabab and Islamic State affiliates continue to affect daily life across Somalia, creating security risks even as parts of Mogadishu show expanding commercial activity, rights groups and counterterrorism analysts said.

Human Rights Watch said hundreds of civilians were killed in 2024 in violence attributed to jihadist groups or clan clashes, and U.N. and regional monitors have detailed widespread abuses and displacement, according to Fox News reporting. The persistence of armed checkpoints, routine extortion and limited local policing has left many Somalis navigating a mixture of improved urban services and continuing threats.

The continued presence of militias matters for national governance, border security and the economy because the groups both enforce local control and extract revenue that sustains operations. That dynamic has prompted stepped-up international counterterrorism activity and renewed debate about how best to support Somali institutions while protecting civilians. For broader coverage of similar conflicts and governance challenges, see our Conflict Coverage.

Background

Somalia has not fully recovered from the collapse of central authority after the civil war that began in the early 1990s. Large parts of southern and central Somalia remain contested, while regions such as Puntland exercise regional autonomy and Somaliland continues to operate with de facto independence though it is not internationally recognized.

The security picture is a patchwork. Mogadishu and other urban centers show signs of economic recovery, including new construction and rising real estate activity in some neighborhoods, even as rural districts face repeated militant attacks, displacement and limited state presence. Millions of Somalis remain internally displaced because of conflict, drought and flooding over recent years.

Analysts and local residents point to weak public services, limited policing capacity and corruption as factors that allow nonstate armed groups to expand influence. Where the state is thin, militants often provide basic services, adjudicate disputes and levy informal taxes, creating local dependencies that complicate military solutions.

Details From Officials and Records

Human Rights Watch and U.N. monitoring teams have documented civilian harm from clashes between militants and progovernment forces, interclan fighting and attacks on population centers. Monitoring bodies and analysts estimate al-Shabab draws annual revenues in the low hundreds of millions of dollars from a range of activities, including extortion, taxation of trade, and illegal levies on agriculture and public services.

  • Reported sources of revenue include extortion at checkpoints, forced contributions, taxation of imports and local trade, kidnappings for ransom and fees for access to services.
  • Analysts say property holdings, informal business ventures and schemes tied to road and vehicle fees also generate funds that sustain operations over time.

Security analysts say al-Shabab continues to control or influence large swaths of rural south and central Somalia and applies strict social rules and recruitment practices where it holds sway. That influence fluctuates with military pressure, local alliances and the incentives available to civilians and local leaders.

International military partners, including U.S. Africa Command, regional navies and African Union forces, have carried out air strikes and ground operations against both IS-affiliated fighters in Puntland and al-Shabab elements near southern ports in recent years. African Union partners transitioned a long-running peacekeeping mission into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, known as ATMIS, with a mandate to support Somali security forces and a planned drawdown and handover of responsibilities.

Reactions and Next Steps

Somali residents describe mixed realities. Some entrepreneurs and residents in parts of Mogadishu say daily life is improving and businesses are expanding. Others, particularly in rural areas and smaller towns, report routine checkpoints, extortion and the constant threat of attack that limits trade and movement.

Civil society and international rights groups have called for stronger protections for civilians during counterterrorism operations, more accountability for abuses by all armed actors, and greater investment in policing, courts and local administration so ordinary people have nonviolent alternatives to dealing with security problems.

Former U.S. and international counterterrorism officials warn that routine payments to armed groups operate as an involuntary taxation system that finances militants and strengthens their local control. Local leaders and analysts say the most durable solution would combine security operations with efforts to expand accountable services, reduce corruption and create economic alternatives for communities that currently depend on militant patronage.

Political leaders in Somalia and international partners face competing priorities: supporting economic recovery in urban centers, sustaining pressure on militant groups, and funding institution-building that extends rule of law beyond city limits. Donor coordination and clear benchmarks for transfers of security responsibility to Somali institutions are widely seen as necessary to avoid security vacuums as foreign forces withdraw or reduce footprints.

Analysis

The facts on the ground illustrate a governance dilemma: security and development reinforce each other, but both are undermined when nonstate actors control territory and revenue. Al-Shabab’s diversified funding streams give it resilience to survive military pressure and to provide services that can win local acquiescence or support.

For policymakers, the tradeoffs are stark. Kinetic operations can degrade militant capabilities but risk civilian casualties and displacement that fuel grievances. Conversely, programs that expand accountable services and reduce corruption can undercut militant finance over time but require sustained funding, political will and credible local partners.

Key open questions include whether Somali authorities can extend effective, transparent governance beyond urban centers and how international partners will balance immediate counterterrorism goals with longer term institution-building. How those choices are prioritized will shape Somalia’s security, economic prospects and the long-term ability to protect citizens and borders.

Related Articles

Back to top button